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Introduction 
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of 
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it 
was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the 
season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of 
despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us.1 
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the “international human 
rights regime” — stressing the universal character of human rights — 
is a rather established feature of current “world society” and a very 
good example of the ongoing processes of “globalisation”.2  The, 
                                                     
1 Charles Dickens: A Tale of two Cities (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company Publishers, 
[1859] 1925), p. 3. 
2 The analysis of “international regimes” (or institutions) has been in focus of scholarly attention 
for more than two decades. Originally, the regime concept was an alternative way for students of 
international relations to deal with co-operative relations in what otherwise was considered as an 
anarchic environment; i.e. the international system/society. Bertil Dunér: The Global Human 
Rights Regime (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2002), pp. 27f. The classical definition of a regime is as 
follows. International regimes are “sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and deci-
sion-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of interna-
tional relations”. Stephen D. Krasner (ed.): International Regimes (Ithaca, New York and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 2. 
The idea of human rights has its roots far back in history, but the “international human rights 
regime” that we know today date back to the birth of the United Nations (UN). The core of this 
regime is, on the one hand, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), 1948, and on 
the other hand, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, and, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ((ICESCR), 1966. Tim Dunne 
and Nicholas J. Wheeler: “Introduction: Human Rights and the Fifty Years’ Crisis”, in Tim Dunne 
and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.): Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999), p. 1. 
The term “world society” will be elaborated in fuller length below. In spite of this, we need a 
preliminary definition for now. Characteristic for a “world society” — as presented from Imman-
uel Kant (with his ius cosmopoliticum) to John W. Burton (associated with the metaphor of inter-
national relations as a “cob-web”) — is that it takes the global population as a whole as the focus 
of global societal identities and arrangements. Just as in the case with international systems and 
international societies, world societies can be regional or global. See Immanuel Kant: “Perpetual 
Peace”, in M. Forsyth H. M. A. Keens-Soper, and P. Savigear (eds.): The Theory of International 
Relations: Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitschke (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970); and John 
W. Burton: World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).  
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today sixty years old, regime is however not uncontroversial. Its 
universal status has always been challenged, during the Cold War by 
the Eastern bloc, and lately by a heterogeneous body of critics — 
reaching from e.g. East Asian and Islamic scholars and politicians to 
Feminist debaters — who argue that the regime is a western, 
masculine, and intolerant expression of universalism. In fact, human 
rights, not to mention “humanitarian intervention”, critics argue, are 
nothing else than an expression of western, male chauvinist neo-
imperialism.3 These alternative understandings of the character of 
human rights have in the literature been cast in different ways. In the 
following I will use the dichotomy, “universal” vs. “relative” rights, 
in order to organise and understand the different views found in the 
debate.4 
Given the situation sketched, it is difficult to see clearly the ways 
in which direction(s) the international human rights regime might 
develop in the future. Do we face a spring of hope or a winter of 
despair for international human rights? On the one hand, it is not only 
difficult to enforce compliance with universal standards; the very 
idea that there exist universal standards is under threat. On the other 
hand, it can be dangerous to give up the idea that it is desirable to live 
                                                                                                                 
The concept of globalisation and the processes of globalisations are object for extensive discus-
sions and debates within academia today. When I refer to “globalisation” I have in mind a process, 
or more correct several processes, that still goes on and through which the world in many respects 
has been becoming a single place. Jan Aart Scholte, whom I agree with, writes that: “the interna-
tional realm is a patchwork of bordered countries, while the global sphere is a web of trans-border 
networks”. Jan Aart Scholte: “The Globalization of World Politics”, p. 14. See also, David Held, 
Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton: Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 
3 See e.g.: Chris Brown: “Human Rights”, in John Baylis and Steve Smith: The Globalization of 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed., 2001), pp. 610ff; and, by the same author: “Universal Human Rights: A Critique”, in Tim 
Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.): Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).  
4 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston: International Human Rights in Context: Law. Politics. 
Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 366. Other possible terms to use are, e.g. 
“absolute” vs. “contingent”, or “moral monism” vs. “relativism”. See e.g. Bhikhu Parekh: 
“Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler: Human Rights in 
Global Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 128ff. 
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 in a world where individual political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights are taken seriously. The situation is complicated. 
If we (like the author to this article do) find it valuable and 
desirable to live in a world in which freedoms and “rights” are 
enjoyed by everyone, how do we then save the notion of universal 
human rights from the problems so meritorious pointed out by its 
critics? This question is what this article ultimately is about. To be 
more precise, the aim of the article is to investigate in which way the 
notion of universal human rights can be saved from its critics without 
falling into the pitfalls stressed by them, like e.g. (cultural) 
intolerance and neo-imperialism. Hence, the ambition is to diagnose 
a number of practical problems and present some tentative thoughts 
of how they can be dealt with (in the future). Because of the huge 
span of the issue at stake (international human rights) and the limited 
space for disposal, the article is most fairly described as a “think 
piece” (i.e. a rough sketch or blueprint) and not a full-fledged and 
final statement of my views regarding the questions initiated and 
discussed. The article is tentative, but will (hopefully) give some 
ideas of how one might proceed in a profitable way. To be brief, the 
ambition is heuristic rather than realistic. 
Human rights can, analytically speaking, be studied from three 
different theoretical categories, namely: “normative”, “empirical”, 
and “constructive” theory.5 Each category of theory deals with 
                                                     
5 The lowest common denominator of the three categories of theory is that they are “operative” 
theories, i.e. they try to say something about the “reality”.  Normative as well as empirical theory is 
based on some sort of meta-theory. Meta-theory precedes operative theory and consists of funda-
mental stipulations about ontology (theory of the nature of reality), epistemology (theory of 
knowledge), and axiology (theory of value). From this statement follows that normative as well as 
empirical theory lacks a fixed foundation, sooner or later one reach the level of meta-theory and to 
assumptions that is not possible to verify. Constructive theory, based on normative and empirical 
ditto as it is, is therefore always possible to criticise. It would take us too far to discuss the meta-
theoretical foundations for the present article here (in length). Instead, I refer the interested reader 
to some of my earlier works. See e.g. Mikael Baaz: “Meta-Theoretical Foundations for the Study 
of Global Social Relations from the Perspective of the New Political Economy of Development”, 
Journal of International Relations and Development, 1999, no. 2, vol. 4, pp. 461-471; and Mikael 
Baaz: A Meta-theoretical Foundation for the Study of International Relations in a Global Era: A 
Social Constructivist Approach (Göteborg: Padrigu Papers, 2002). 
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different questions. If our focus is normative, then we are 
interested in what human rights ought to be and how they can be 
justified. If the focus is empirical, then the searchlight is directed 
towards what human rights are and how they can be understood or 
explained. we can also have a constructive focus. In that case we 
are interested in what human rights can be and how this is 
achieved; i.e. how do we achieve as much as possible of what we 
want (human rights, understood as respect for individual human 
beings) given that the reality looks the way it does.6 
As argued the different types of the theory are merely 
analytical construction and in reality they overlap. On an 
analytical level they can, however, be separated. Given the aim 
with the article we need to consider all three categories of theory. 
If we shall say something about international human rights in the 
future, both the ought and the can question must be answered in 
the analysis. It is “senseless” to discuss what the international 
human rights regime ought to be separated from what it actually 
can be. Furthermore, it is highly inappropriate and, in fact, 
unethical trying to answer the question what it can be without 
paying any attention to if it also ought to be like this. The idea that 
it would be possible to go directly from normative theory to 
constructive theory is, in the best case futile and in the worst case 
dangerous. Neither can we go directly from empirical to 
constructive theory. In constructive enterprises, both normative 
and empirical theories serve as foundation for the construction. In 
order to answer the question what the international human rights 
regime can be and how this vision can be fulfilled in a given 
situation we need normative as well as empirical knowledge. On 
the basis of our constructive theory, we can, if we like, give 
                                                     
6 My methodological concerns are based upon the thinking of Lennart Lundquist. See e.g. his, 
Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik [The Scientific Study of Politics] (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 
1993), ch. 3, note especially figure 11, p. 85; and, Demokratins väktare [The Guardians of 
Democracy] (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1998), pp. 27f. Cf. the outline of R. J. Vincents’s “clas-
sic” in the field of international human rights: Human Rights in International Relations (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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  suggestions of (political) implementation measures.7 
This article — which is based upon primary sources, in the 
form of e.g. international declarations, conventions, and covenants 
as well as secondary sources, in the form of e.g. political 
statements, scholarly and journalistic writings — is disposed in 
three sections, emanating from the different types of theory.8 
Hence, one normative, one empirical, and one constructive section 
follow in order. In a final section the arguments in the article is 
winded up and some concluding reflections about the discussions 
carried out are given.  
Normative theory: What ought international human 
rights to be? 
In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice; 
In practice, there is.9 
The motive for doing a normative analysis is that the empirical 
analysis not will be meaningful if we do not know what to look 
after and that the constructive analysis cannot be done if we do not 
know what we ought to do (in the future) and why. 
The idea of international human rights is not an obvious one, 
therefore some initial clarifications of what is meant by the idea is 
                                                     
7 Lennart Lundquist: Demokratins väktare [The Guardians of Democracy], p. 28; Det veten-
skapliga studiet av politik [The Scientific Study of Politics], p. 85; and, Bo Rothstein: Vad bör 
staten göra? Om välfärdsstatens moraliska och politiska logik [What Ought the State Do? 
About the Moral and Political Logic of the Welfare State] (Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 1994), pp. 
12ff., note especially figure 1.1, p. 24. 
8 The scholarly writing taken into consideration in this article is not only written by legal scholars, 
but also scholars in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Political Science, Sociol-
ogy, and Philosophy, et cetera. The reason for this is the inter-disciplinary character of the topic in 
question (i.e. Human Rights), which covers at least law, politics, and morals; all placed in a socie-
tal context. Note e.g. the title of one of the standard textbooks in the field written by Henry J. 
Steiner and Philip Alston: International Human Rights in Context: Law. Politics. Morals (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
9 Chuck Reid (http://www.musicfolio.com/qoutes/america.htm). The site was visited 2005-05-26. 
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appropriate. What are “rights”? And, in extension, what does it 
mean that these rights are, on the one hand “human”, and, on the 
other hand, “international”? 
It is possible to distinguish between four different types of 
rights: claim- (e.g. a right generated through a “contract”), liberty- 
(e.g. the right to dress as we please), power- (e.g. the right to vote) 
and immunity-rights (e.g. to be legally insane). Other 
categorisations are possible. But, in order to keep it simple, a 
(claim-)right (according to, some scholars, the only “true” right) 
is, with some exceptions, a right held against someone or 
something. Let me illustrate this point by two examples: a lender 
has a right to repayment of a debt against the borrower; and, a 
property owner has the right to exclusive enjoyment of his 
property to any person. The attribution of a right is however not 
very meaningful without the possibility of a correlative duty 
resting somewhere.10 The philosophical discussions about rights 
are very extensive and problematic. My aim here is only to give a 
brief notion of what I mean by a right and not to give myself into 
this discussion in any length.11 Briefly put, “right and duty are 
different names for the same normative relations, according to the 
point of view from which it is regarded”.12 
The addition of “human” to rights means that every human 
being has them, regardless if they are black or white, belong to 
community A or B, and so on. Individuals have rights, simply 
because they are human. Before the end of WW II human rights 
where more or less associated with domestic political and legal 
systems. But in the last six decades in general and during the 
1990s in particular questions regarding human rights have been 
put on the international agenda. Thus, when I talk about 
                                                     
10 R.J. Vincent: Human Rights in International Relations, p. 9. 
11 See instead, e.g. Chris Brown: “Human Rights”, p. 602. For a more elaborative discussion on 
the concept “rights”, see Nigel E. Simmonds: Juridiska principfrågor: Rättvisa, gällande rätt 
och rättigheter [Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law and Rights] (Stockholm: 
Nordstedts juridik, 1996 
12 S. I. Benn and R. S. Peter: Social Principles and the Democratic State (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1959), p. 88f., quoted in, J. R. Vincent: Human Rights in International Relations, p. 9. 
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 international human rights I have in mind a number of basic 
rights, of international and not only national concern, that every 
individual in the world enjoy simply because they are human.  
Does it exist any fixed foundations for what international 
human rights ought to be, or are we directed only to free-hand 
drawings that can change from one situation to the other? I do 
believe that there exists a rather fixed foundation of what 
international human rights ought to be. The foundation can be 
found in the body of international (and regional) declarations, 
conventions, covenants and treaties that the sovereign nations 
states in the “international society” have come to agreement with 
during the post-WW II era. The core of this body of documents 
are to be found in the UNDHR (1948), the ICCPR (1966), and the 
ICESCR (1966) but also in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the International 
Convention on all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (1979), and the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989).13 The latter conventions are more or 
less specifications of different aspects (for particular “identities”) 
of the former ones, in order to underscore the importance of 
certain dimensions and values. The former documents provide an 
authoritative statement of internationally recognised human rights, 
both regarding “positive” and “negative rights”.14 Among other 
things, the ”international bill of human rights” recognises the right 
to:  
                                                     
13 Among the regional instruments we find e.g.: The European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the American Conventions on Human 
Rights (1969), the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), the Arab 
Charter on Human Rights (1994), and the Commonwealth of Independent States Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1995). For a more complete list of different 
human rights instruments, see e.g. P. R. Gandhi: International Human Rights Documents 
(London: Blackstone Press, 2nd ed., 2000). 
14 With positive rights are understood rights such as collective provision of education and 
healthcare and by negative rights are understood rights such as freedom from repressive gov-
ernment policies. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler: “Introduction: Human Rights and the 
Fifty Years’ Crisis”, p.1 
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[E]quality of rights without discrimination, life, liberty and 
security of person, protection against slavery, protection 
against torture and cruel an inhuman punishment, liberty and 
security of person, equal protection of the law, protection of 
privacy, family, and home, freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion, freedom of opinion, expression, and the press, 
freedom of assembly, and association, social security, work 
(under favourable conditions), food, clothing and housing, 
healthcare and social services, special protections of the 
children, education, self-determination, and protection of 
minority culture.15 
Thanks to the existing internationally recognised instruments of 
human rights, the “reconstruction” of what international human 
rights ought to be is relatively easy to do. I do not believe the 
“reconstruction” made above to be very controversial. Human 
rights norms are in fact today more or less fully internationalised. 
But implementation and enforcement has remained almost 
completely national. This is one of the major obstacles regarding 
the practical impact of human rights in contemporary 
“international society”. From confession and ratification of 
international human rights does not necessarily follow an actual 
commitment. Furthermore, the UN Commission of Human Rights 
(UNCHR) resolved at its first session, in early 1947, that it had 
“no power to take action in regard to any complaints concerning 
human rights”.16 This means, traditionally speaking, that neither 
UN nor any other (regional or national) agent can “intervene” in a 
country that violates human rights without breaking the 
                                                     
15 The “bill of international human rights” is based upon the UNDHR (1948), the ICCPR 
(1966), and the ICESCR (1966). In my list above, not all rights are included. Most important 
aspects are, however, included. For a complete overview, see Jack Donnelly: “Social Construc-
tion of International Human Rights”, in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.): Human 
Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 74, table 2. 
16 UN Document E/259, 1947, para. 22. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) ratified 
this decision later the same year in E/RES/75 (V); a document that also severely restricted 
Commission access to the thousands of complaints that the UN receives every year. The UN 
document mentioned here is quoted in Jack Donnelly: “Social Construction of International 
Human Rights”, p. 73, note 3. 
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 (fundamental) principle of non-intervention of the UN–charter 
(article 2[7]), unless the country intervened has agreed upon this 
in advance. This is a problem that I will return to in the sections 
below. What remains to be done in this section is to discuss how 
the rights in the international bill of human rights can be justified. 
One fundamental part of the claim that there exist such things 
as international human rights has been that, except being 
universal, they are not subject to change over time, since they 
express the essential nature of human beings. By tradition, human 
rights have been founded on some version of  “natural law”. The 
origin of natural law thinking dates back to ancient Greek and 
early Christian scholars, but in its modern form it is based upon 
medieval Catholic theology. The general idea is that human beings 
share an essential nature, which dictates that certain kinds of 
human goods are always and everywhere desired. Accordingly, 
there exist common moral standards that shall govern all human 
relations. These common standards can be distinguished by the 
application of reason to human affairs. Thus, natural law provided 
the foundation for a theory of rights in the Middle Ages.17 But, in 
the rough world of Medieval and Renaissance political practice 
(e.g. in England and on the Italian peninsula) rights had quite 
different connotations. Here a right was a concession the 
individual extracted from someone superior to him, often by force. 
A good example is the Magna Carta (1215). The rights in this 
charter are not based upon natural law but positive law (read 
contract law). The Magna Carta contain rights (and duties) for a 
certain group of people (the Barons of England) in relation to their 
king and there is no sense in which they could be considered as 
universal or human rights. The Magna Carta is clearly a contract, 
emanating from a political bargain. Hence, we can identify two 
traditions for funding rights, universalism and relativism. The two 
                                                     
17 Chris Brown: “Human Rights”, p. 602. See also: Tore Strömberg: Rättsfilosofins historia i 
huvuddrag [The Essential Feature of Legal Philosophy] (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 3rd ed., 1989), 
ch. 5, 12, and 13; and, J. R. Vincent: Human Rights in International Relations, ch. 2. 
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traditions are, however not, as we shall see below, necessarily 
incompatible.18 
In fact, the modern (liberal) view of international human rights 
— developed initially by scholars such as Hugo Grotius, Thomas 
Hobbes, and John Locke  — are a synthesis between rights 
entailed by natural law and positive law. This conceptually 
“suspect” position has been, and is still, criticised by thinkers such 
as Friedrich Hegel, Jeremy Bentham, Karl Marx, and subsequent 
(pure) relativist, or communitarian, scholars.19 This disagreement 
is still in the forefront of the current battle between universalists 
and relativists.  
I think the dilemma, or battle, can be dealt with as follows. To 
begin with, I believe that a theory of international human rights 
needs to be founded in or influenced by some sort of “soft” natural 
law thinking. Soft because it does not claim the existence of 
unyielding principles of reason, like e.g. that humans have a 
primordial right to freedom and equality. Such claims, like the 
existence of a primordial right to freedom and equality, does only, 
as argued by e.g. the Swedish “Legal Realist” Axel Hägerström 
and his disciples in the so-called “School of Uppsala”, contributes 
to sharpen the antagonism between different nations and obstruct 
reasonable agreements between them.20 Neither does soft natural 
law thinking put in some kind of social contract between natural 
law and positive law. Furthermore, the soft natural right shall not 
be held to be immutable but dependent in its concrete shaping by 
the surrounding “societal” context. The normative foundation 
underlying the idea of soft natural law based human rights does 
not exist in advance but must be negotiated and decided by a 
majority of the member states in the UN. Thus, the international 
human rights regime shall understood as a social, man-made, 
construction. Through such a procedure objections regarding 
                                                     
18 Chris Brown: “Human Rights”, p. 602; and,  “Universal Human Rights: A Critique”, p. 106. 
19 Chris Brown: “Human Rights”, p. 604. 
20 See Tore Strömberg. Rättsfilosofins historia i huvuddrag [The Essential Features of Legal 
Philosophy] (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1989, 3rd ed.), p. 69 
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 cultural imperialism and thereto-related objections can be 
neutralised and the normative base for human rights be more 
legitimate than the current “Western” base. Furthermore, the 
actual problem with possible abuses is also potentially neutralised 
by such a procedure. The only thing not possible to change is the 
core value of the regime, namely a firm demand of respect of the 
value of human dignity. From this follows that there exist certain 
fundamental human rights, that not can be dissolved generally or 
restricted arbitrary but only on certain institutionalised grounds 
and in legal order. Whether one shall attach oneself to this 
normative view based on soft natural law thinking or not, is at the 
end of the day not a scientific question but a moral one.21  
Finally, it is not a secret that this normative standpoint is based 
on “Western” values. A fact that, from my point of view, does not 
necessarily disqualifies the standpoint per se. It has advocates 
outside the West as well as opponents within the western cultural 
sphere. More progressive and fruitful is therefore to speak about a 
“global culture of human rights”, instead of a “Western” one, 
based not on geographical culture belongings but a shared supra-
cultural common-value system. After this normative excursion, let 
us now turn the searchlight to the empirical level of human rights. 
Empirical Theory: What are international human rights? 
America did not invent human rights. In a very real sense, 
human rights invented America.22 
My primary interest in this section is to analyse to what extent 
international humans rights are put into practice in current 
                                                     
21 This section is inspired by Sven Strömberg: Rättsfilosofins historia i huvuddrag [The Essen-
tial Feature of Legal Philosophy], p. 81. Cf. R. J. Vincent: Human Rights and International 
Relations, pp. 53ff.; and, Chris Brown: “Universal Human Rights: A Critique”, pp. 120ff. 
22 James Earl Carter (http://www.musicfolio.com/qoutes/america.htm). The site was visited 
2005-07-16. 
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international relations characterised by overall (a) rapid 
process(es) of globalisations(s) (read homogenisation) but also, in 
parallel, fragmentation. Are international human rights exercised 
without restrictions or does it exist factors that prevent that they 
are exercised fully in practice? As guideline for the section two 
rather straightforward questions will serve: What are the 
possibilities to apply international human rights in present 
international relations? Why does the current situation look the 
way it does?  
Human rights have a long history in theory and have even been 
practised occasionally. But it was the American and French 
revolution, in 1776 and 1789 respectively, that sought to create 
national politics based on broadly shared human rights. Despite 
the rhetorics of universality, human rights, however, remained 
essentially a concern for the sovereign nation state, whether to be 
accepted or not, until the end of WW II when they (eventually) 
were recognised in global international law.23 
The goals of the UN are listed in art. 1 of the UN-charter. 
Among them are included the promotion and encouragement of 
respects for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, 
regardless of race, sex, language or religion. The humanitarian 
goal of the Organisation is elaborated further in art. 55 of the 
Charter. In art. 56 it is stated that “all Members pledge themselves 
to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55”.24 Even though the word “pledge” most likely implies 
a legal obligation, it can be (and indeed has been) debated if 
human rights were to be observed immediately (i.e. in 1945), 
when the rights in question were not listed neither defined, or if 
the observation was a future goal (sine die). The vague language 
                                                     
23 David P. Forsythe: Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000), p. 3. See, e.g. art. 1, 2, 13, 55, 56, 62, and 68, the UN Charter (1945); and 
the UNDHR (1948). 
24 Art. 55 and 56, the UN Charter (1945). Italics added. 
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 probably leaves a wide discretion both regarding speed and means 
for the states to carry out their obligations.25  
The fundamental declaration regarding international human 
rights are the UNDHR (1948), a resolution passed by the UN 
General Assembly on the 10th of December 1948, by forty-eight 
votes to nil. Eight states (the six communist countries as well as 
Saudi Arabia and South Africa) abstained voting. The stipulation 
of rights falls into two main categories, civil and political rights, 
on the one hand, and, economic, social, and cultural rights, on the 
other. This division — which mirror the fact that the international 
human rights regime was questioned from the very beginning — 
was later manifested by the two covenants, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, regarding human rights that was developed from the 
UNDHR and completed in 1966. It is a common 
misunderstanding (among laymen) that states are under a legal 
obligation to respect the rights in the UNDHR. But most states 
that voted in favour of the Declaration regarded it as a statement 
of distant ideal, without any legal obligations. The UNDHR was 
not more than a list of rights that states pledge themselves to 
promote under art. 55 and 56 of the UN-charter.26 From art. 13, in 
the same charter, follows, however, that the GA can — via the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) — not only initiate 
studies but also issue recommendations on human rights 
questions.27 
As just said, eighteen years after the passing of the UNDHR, 
the UN completed the drafting of two treaties designed to 
transform the principles of the Declaration into binding legal 
documents. They more or less, except from the fact that they have 
been divided into two documents, follow the UNDHR. The former 
covenant also provides for a monitoring system, which, however, 
is rather weak.  The only compulsory element for the member 
                                                     
25 Peter Malanczuk: Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (London: 
Routledge, 1997, 7th revised ed.), p. 212 
26 Peter Malanczuk: Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International, p. 213. 
27 See art 13 and 62, the UN Charter (1945). 
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states are that they shall present a report every fifth year on the 
national human rights situation to the Human Rights Committee 
of the UN.28 There also exist an optional procedure in art. 41, the 
ICCPR (1966), by which a state can complain against another 
state. This procedure must, however, have been accepted by both 
states (in advance). The procedure is rather toothless since there is 
no reference to a judicial body that can take binding decisions. In 
conclusion, the legal obligations that follow from the Covenants 
are weak.29 One explanation to this is to be found in (the very 
important) article 2(7) of the UN-charter, which states that nothing 
in the charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters, which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (read 
human rights issues). The major obstacle with the international 
human rights regime is the contradiction between the norms in 
different treaties and the lack of a UN Human Rights Court, or 
something similar, to enforce them.30 
The international human rights system is a system in which the 
individual is the primary legal subject (a “world society”). This 
system is however situated within another system, a state-system, 
in which the sovereign nation state is the primary legal subject (an 
“international society”). So far, with few exceptions, state 
sovereignty has had priority over individual human rights.31 
The international protection of human rights still leaves much 
to be desired and there exist no global consensus on the content, 
and implementation of these rights are often very difficult to 
achieve. From ratification of international instruments does 
(unfortunately) not automatically follow an actual commitment.32  
                                                     
28 Art. 40, the ICCPR (1966). 
29 Art. 40, the ICCPR (1966). See also, Peter Malanczuk: Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to 
International, pp. 215ff. 
30 David P. Forsythe: Human Rights in International Relations, p. 55 
31 See Baaz, Mikael (2001): Statssuveränitet och humanitär intervention: (O)förenliga principer 
i dagens globaliserade värld? [State Sovreignty and Humanitarian Intervention: (In)compatible 
principles in Today’s Globalised World]. Göteborg: The School of Business, Economics and 
Law at Göteborg University, Department of Law. 
32 J. R. Vincent: Human Rights in International Relations, p. 99. 
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 The UN-charter, as shown by its travaux préparatoires 
(something like a “preparatory work”), did not attach so much 
significance to the promotion and protection of human rights as to 
the maintenance of international peace and security.  
Intervention on humanitarian grounds was not considered a 
legitimate practice during the Cold War. But, during the 1990s the 
scene changed dramatically. Severe human rights violations were 
no longer considered exclusively to belong to the domestic 
domain of states, irrespective of art. 2(7), the UN-charter.33 What 
has happened is that the investigation, discussion, condemnation, 
and enforcement of human rights violations in a state have, at least 
to a certain extent and (important to note) in some cases, become 
compatible with the sovereignty of that state. The cases I have in 
mind are: Operation “Safe Haven (1991) in Iraq (SC7res/688), 
Operation “Restore Hope” (1992) in Somalia (SC/res/794), and 
“Opération Turquuoise” (1994) in Rwanda (SC/res/929). Non-
western states, especially China, but also Russia, are, however, 
suspicious of legitimating humanitarian intervention by a 
broadening of chapter VII, the UN-charter. The humanitarian 
operations carried out during the first half of the 1990s have in 
spite of these hesitations been possible, since the “crimes” in 
question was considered as being of the calibre that they were 
covered by the principle of erga omnes.34 
Russia’s doubtfulness against the practice of humanitarian 
intervention developed from suspiciousness to open opposition in 
the late 1990s with the outbreak of the so-called “Kosovo-crisis”. 
                                                     
33 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy: “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics, in 
John Baylis and Steve Smith: The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to Interna-
tional Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 2nd ed.), p. 471. In this text (pp. 472ff) 
is given an (elaborated) definition of the concept of humanitarian intervention. Simply put it is 
about “intervention” — i.e. a forcible breach of sovereignty that interferes in a state’s internal 
affairs — on humanitarian grounds. Peter Malanczuk: Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to 
International, p. 220.  
34 With erga omnes is meant obligations owed by every state to the international community as 
a whole. Rebecca M. M. Wallace: International Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 3rd ed., 
1997), pp. 178f. 
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Even though the SC reached consensus around resolution 1199, 
determining that there was “a threat to peace and security in the 
region” and demanded a cease-fire, and threatened to take more 
drastic steps if this resolution was not obeyed, Russia made clear 
that it would veto any resolution authorising the use of force. In 
October 1998 the NATO, however, made it clear that it would be 
willing to use military force if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) did not comply with the Council resolution. The legal 
ground offered was “intervention on humanitarian grounds”. The 
FRY did not comply, and therefore the NATO launched air strikes 
toward targets in FRY, starting on the 25th of March 1999. The 
new thing with the NATO attack was that it was launched without 
a mandate from the SC. Hereby, from an international legal 
perspective the NATO intervention was illegal. It is true that the 
SC in its resolution 1199 determined the situation in Kosovo to be 
a threat to peace and security (according to art. 39, the UN-
charter) but it never sanctioned the use of military force to restore 
international peace and security (according to art. 42, the UN-
charter).35 
In the aftermath of the attacks, a discussion has been initiated if 
the NATO action was legitimate anyhow — if it was illegal but 
legitimate.36 To conclude: in spite of the developments during the 
1990s, the universal status of the international human rights 
regime is (still) challenged by critics from different camps. What 
remains to be done in this section is to provide an (historical) 
answer of why this is the case. The answer shall be sought in the 
                                                     
35 Henry J. Steiner and Philph Alston: International Human Rights in Context: Law. Politics, 
pp.653ff; The Kosovo Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and, Nicholas J. 
Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy: “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics”, pp. 484f. 
36 This standpoint — illegal but legitimate — has been put forward by, among others, the 
members of an independent commission appointed by the Swedish Prime Minister Göran 
Persson. The main argument in the report presented by the Commission is that the UN Charter 
shall be interpreted to the intention rather than to the letter. There is, according to the members 
of the commission, a necessary choice to make. It is better that the international community 
does something than passively watch flagrant and systematic violence of fundamental human 
rights (see the Kosovo report). 
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 evolution of the international relations over the last full five 
centuries. 
Within the so-called “English Historical School” of 
International Relations,37 there is a distinction made between 
“international systems” and an “international societies”. We can 
understand the difference between the concepts if we think as 
follows. An “international society” is:  
[A] group of states (or more generally, a group of 
independent political communities) which not merely form a 
system, in the sense that the behaviour of each necessary 
factor in the calculations of the others, but also have 
established by dialogue and consent common rules and 
institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise 
their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.38 
From the end of the fifteenth century an onwards an international 
system, emanating from Europe, or to be more precise 
                                                     
37 The basic problem anyone trying to understand contemporary international relations has to 
face is that there is such much material to look at that it is very difficult to know which things 
that matter and which do not. Faced with such a problem we have to resort to some (operative 
empirical) theory, understood as some kind of simplifying device that allows us which facts 
that matter and which do not. Steve Smith and John Baylis: “Introduction”, in John Baylis and 
Steve Smith (eds.): The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Rela-
tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 2nd ed.), p. 2ff. International relations have dur-
ing its a bit over eighty years’ intellectual history been dominated by three competing theories: 
Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism. For an intellectual history of the disciplinary development 
of International Relations, see e.g.: Mikael Baaz: “Studiet  av internationella relationer och 
doktrinen om gemensam säkerhet”  [The Study of International Relations and the Doctrine 
about Common Security]. Background material for the, by the Swedish Government author-
ised, official report: Konfliktförebyggande verksamhet: En Studie [Conflict Prevention: A 
Study] (Stockholm: Utrikesdepratementet, Ds 1997:18), 1996. For a more extensive study, see 
e.g. Thorbjørn L. Knutsen.: A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 2nd ed., 1997). What makes the English School especially interesting 
for scholars of International Relations is that this theory actually constitutes a via med between 
Realism and Liberalism. See e.g. Mikael Baaz: A Meta-theoretical Foundation for the Study of 
International Relations in a Global Era: A Social Constructivist Approach, especially ch. 2 and 
4. 
38 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson: “Introduction”, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.): 
The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 1. 
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Renaissance Italy, linking earlier virtually isolated regional 
systems/societies together, was brought into being.39 This process 
started much earlier than an international society came into 
being.40 
Then, how does an international society come into being? Is 
the development immanent or intentional? When have all, or a 
part of an international system developed to an international 
society? These questions are put forward by Barry Buzan, in an 
interesting article, published in 1993.41 Regarding the first 
question, Buzan, inspired by the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, 
differs between two types of societies: gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft. In the former type, society is considered as 
something organic and traditional; a society that involves bonds of 
common sentiment, experience, and identity. It is a society, which 
is cemented by some sort cultural hegemonity, like e.g. religion 
and/or language; by some sort of “natural” “we-ness”. Examples 
of such international societies are e.g. ancient Greece and the early 
modern European international society that emerged in 
Renaissance Italy. In the latter type, societies are understood as 
something functionally and contractually constructed rather than 
immanently evolved. A good example of this kind of international 
society is the European Union. They are characterised by being 
constructed “by acts of will”.42 Hence, an international society 
can, theoretically speaking, come into existence, in two distinct 
ways, through a civilisational (gemeinschaft) and a functional 
(gesellschaft) process.  
                                                     
39 Robert H. Jackson: “The Evolution of International Society”, in John Baylis and Steve 
Smith: The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 2nd ed.), pp. 35ff.  See also, L. S. Stavrianos: The World 
since 1500: A Global History (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 7th ed., 1995). 
40 See, Gerrit W. Gong: The Standard of “Civilisation” in International Society (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1984). 
41 Barry Buzan: “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory meet the English School”, International Organization (1993), vol. 47, no. 3. 
42 Barry Buzan: “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory meet the English School”, p. 333. 
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 Except for the difference between system and society, one 
more distinction is necessary to do. We have to differentiate 
between, international societies and “world societies”. 
Characteristic for a “world society” is that it takes the global 
population as a whole (the humanity) as the focus of global 
societal identities and arrangements.43 International societies, just 
as world societies, can be either global or regional in their 
geographical scope. 
Are then the ideas of international society and world society 
opposites or complements? The former standpoint is based upon 
an assumption that identities must be mutually exclusive, that 
people can hold only one identity at the expense of another. This 
is a rather old-fashioned view anchored in nineteenth-century 
nationalisms. A more updated and accurate view is that people are 
quit capable of holding several identities at the same time. One 
can be Gothenburger, Swedish, European, and Western, citizen of 
the world as well as father, son, husband, law student, employee, 
Christian, and Social Democrat, et cetera, all at the same time. If 
this idea is accepted, then it becomes possible to imagine the 
development of a world society alongside a national or a 
civilisational one without any necessary excavation of one by the 
other. The belonging to a group is not essential but imagined, i.e. 
constructed. International society and world society can therefore 
develop at the same time. In fact, an international society cannot 
develop further without parallel development in its corresponding 
world society. Most likely, international societies, just as 
international systems, will, both in gemeinschaft and gesellschaft 
societies, emerge initially within “regional” subsystems and first 
later develop at the global level. As in economics, the rule is 
uneven development; from this follows that, when there exist a 
global international system, in which at least one societal 
subsystem exist, there will develop layers of co-centric societal 
                                                     
43 Barry Buzan: “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory meet the English School”, p. 336f. See the discussion above about regarding 
what is considered to be the legal subject. 
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circles. In the centre, states will have more shared values, fuller 
sets of rules and institutions, than those will in circles that are 
more distant.44 
Contemporary international society is a hybrid. It stems partly 
from the gemeinschaft international society that developed in 
modern Europe and imposed itself on most of the globe during the 
era of imperialism, and in part it reflects a gesellschaft process by 
which different cultures embedded in a system with an increasing 
level of interaction and interdependence gradually have learned to 
come to terms with one another. Today, international society is no 
longer a globalised expression of the European gemeinschaft, 
from which most non-European cultures and peoples were 
excluded due to their colonial or in other terms, unequal status.45 
The foundation of contemporary international society is the 
mutual recognition by more or less all states of each other as 
legally equal sovereign states; if this criteria is used, only very few 
states are now outside the international society. Present day global 
international society is by definition a post-colonial phenomenon. 
But, as could be expected from its partly gemeinschaft origins, it 
has a European, or more correct now a Western, core that is much 
more highly developed than the rest of it regarding the number, 
variety, and intensity of institutions and organisations binding its 
members in a network of regimes. Furthermore, as expected from 
its partly gesellschaft origins, contemporary international society 
is globally multicultural in character and clearly differentiated 
regarding the degree of commitment with which states attach to it. 
After the end of the Cold War, when the rivalry between the East 
and West ended, the complexity and density of the international 
society has substantially increased. 
Accordingly, the current international society is best pictured 
as a construction of (changing) concentric circles. At the “external 
                                                     
44 Barry Buzan: “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory meet the English School”, p. 338ff. 
45 Barry Buzan: “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory meet the English School”, p. 348f. 
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 arena” we find a small number of pariah states, like e.g. Taiwan, 
that is excluded by the unwillingness of many others to 
(diplomatically) acknowledge them. Some states place themselves 
in the outer fringe of the international society by accepting very 
little more than the basic of (formal) diplomatic exchange — 
examples of such a state is North Korea and (at least earlier) 
Libya. In the middle, we find states, like India and China, which 
strive to preserve a high level of independence and select carefully 
what institutions they want to take part in. In the core, the Western 
states are located. These states more or less support as well as 
generate the expanding network of international regimes. 46 The 
international human rights regime can serve as a very good 
example of this state-of-the-art. 
The Gulf War (1991), the crisis in e.g. the former Yugoslavia 
(from 1991-1995), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Kosovo 
(1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003) are good examples of 
how the concentric circles of international society operates and 
identify themselves in relation to fundamental challenges in 
international relations. Furthermore, the cases show how the 
international society arranges itself, depending on the issue at 
stake. The way the international society looks, depends on the 
issue at stake. This is important to remember. 
To conclude: if we situate the earlier discussions about the 
contradiction between the norms in different treaties and the lack 
of an effective enforcement machinery in its historical perspective 
we are well-equipped to understand why the international human 
rights regime work (or does not work) the way it does (or does 
not) in different situations in current international society. The 
international human rights regime is neither supported by any 
effective enforcement machinery, nor by a feeling of a “natural” 
global “we-ness”. After having done this analysis we can now turn 
to the constructive level and discuss what we possibly can achieve 
— given that the world looks the way it does — of what we want. 
                                                     
46 Barry Buzan: “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory meet the English School”, p. 349. 
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Constructive Theory: What can international human 
rights be?  
They always say that time changes things, but you actually 
have to change them yourself.47 
A fanatic is one who can’t change his mind and won’t change 
the subject.48 
In this the last but one section the focus will be on the normative 
level. I will try to present some guiding principles of how to 
overcome the problem presented initially, namely how the notion 
of “universal” human rights can be saved from its critics at the 
dawn of the twenty-first century. Or, to put in a different way: 
how do we bring reality closer to what we want — a world in 
which everyone enjoys freedoms and rights — without falling into 
the pitfalls, such as ethnocentrism and neo-imperialism, pointed 
out by several critics to the notion of “universal” human rights? 
The current international human rights regime, based on 
universalism (i.e. moral/cultural monism), have, in spite of the 
seemingly consensus around it, proven to be very weak, due to the 
lack of an effective enforcement machinery as well as the shortage 
of a natural “we-ness” on the global level. Even judged in its own 
term, the regime has not been very effective. The NATO tried to 
overcome the first problem, the lack of effective enforcement 
machinery, by side-steeping the UN during the Kosovo-crisis in 
1999. This attempt, in spite of the rhetorical acrobatics carried out 
by advocates in favour of the operation who argued that the 
operation was “illegal but morally justifiable”,49 is bound to fall in 
the pitfalls of ethnocentrism, neo-imperialism, and arrogance, and 
must therefore be considered as an “intellectual” cul-de-sac. The 
                                                     
47 Andy Warhol (http://www.musicfolio.com/quotes/change.htm). The site was visited 2005-
05-26. 
48 Winston Churchill (http://www.musicfolio.com/quotes/change.htm). The site was visited 
2005-05-26. 
49 See The Kosovo report. 
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 second problem, the lack of a natural “we-ness” was not even 
considered by the NATO in the Kosovo case. The critique towards 
the NATO action seems to open up for relativism and indeed, in 
one form or another, relativism has become a highly popular 
doctrine lately. But does this mean that we must give up the idea 
that it is good to live in a world where the rights of the individual 
are taken seriously? In order to decide this let us begin by looking 
a bit closer on some of the central beliefs held by relativists and 
universalists, respectively. 
Advocates for relativism rightly insist that no way of life is by 
objective standards possible to be decided the best or to suit all. 
What shall be considered as good life cannot be defined without 
including the character of the individuals involved. Furthermore, 
moral beliefs and practices cannot be detached from its societal or 
cultural context and judged or graded in an abstract manner. The 
relativist core can be boiled down to three statements. Pro primo, 
human beings are not determined but shaped by their society and 
culture and are therefore most likely unable to rise above its 
beliefs and truths. Pro secundo, different societies entertain 
different bodies of beliefs and there exist no neutral ground of 
judging these. Pro tertio, existing values and practices suit the 
members of the society best, and therefore they are entitled to live 
after them.50 
What are then the central beliefs held by universalists? 
Advocates for universalism rightly argues that morality is a matter 
of rational reflection, that it presupposes some conception of 
human being, that at least some moral principles are universally 
valid, and that different ways of life can be evaluated critically.51  
                                                     
50 Bikhu Parekh: “Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, p 133. Cf. Henry J. Steiner and Philph 
Alston: International Human Rights in Context: Law. Politics. Morals, pp. 366ff.; and R. J: 
Vincent: Human Rights and International Relations, p. 37ff. 
51 Bikhu Parekh: “Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, p 136. Cf. Henry J. Steiner and Philph 
Alston: International Human Rights in Context: Law. Politics. Morals, pp. 366ff.; and R. J: 
Vincent: Human Rights and International Relations, p. 37ff. 
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To conclude, the insights provided by both relativists and 
universalists are without doubt interesting and important. In 
principle I agree with the insights presented by both approaches. 
My problem with them is, however, that advocates from both 
camps exaggerate, misinterpret and, in extension draw wrong 
conclusions from the insights generated. These rather serious 
accusations of mine require to be justified.  
Against the relativists I would like to adduce the following. 
Firstly, as indicated above, every society and culture is internally 
differentiated and its members are subject to different sources of 
influences and never confronted by a homogenous and 
determining social whole. Then, what are the (true) values of a 
particular society or culture? Secondly, we do have some means 
of judging a society’s moral beliefs and practices, since some 
values are embedded in and underpin all human societies; to this 
argument I will return below. Therefore, a broad consensus around 
them already exists, if not, it can be secured. Thirdly, we must call 
in to question if the beliefs and practices of a society are good for 
its member. It depends on the situation. They might be familiar for 
the members of the society in question, which, however, is not the 
same as they are good. A prevailing system is definitely not good 
for those who are marginalised and oppressed by it. Such groups 
perhaps accept existing beliefs and practices, not from 
commitment but rather out of fear or the force of habit.52 Let me 
illustrate this point. The apartheid system was “good” for the 
white but not for the black people in South Africa. Eventually, due 
to the apartheid system, South Africa became a pariah in the 
international society. This was bad for the system as a whole. 
South Africa had to pay a very high prize, e.g. regarding its room 
for manoeuvre in the international domain and in slow economic 
growth. When these consequences became obvious for the whites, 
combined with internal pressure from the blacks, the system 
changed and the apartheid system was brought to an end. From 
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 this follow, that a society and a culture can be judged by its 
members with reference to considerations such as the possibility 
to perform and develop but also the possibility to cope with 
changing circumstances.  
The conclusions drawn by the universalists also deserve to be 
criticised. Human individuals are embedded in a societal and 
cultural context that gives a distinct tone to the rational reflections 
done; they are not made in a cultural vacuum. The, ”hard” natural 
law based, notion about the unalterable nature on man is, as 
argued above, vague, and philosophical suspect but also arrogant. 
We have to keep in mind, as underscored by Thomas Luckman 
and Peter Berger, that: “Society is a human product. Society is an 
objective reality. Man is a social product.53 Cultural differences, 
no doubt exist. From this follows not, however, Western 
superiority and that all other cultures are ignorant, unequal 
intellectually, and moral inferior. The idea that one way of life is 
the truly human (read the highest) is morally reprehensible and 
logically incoherent. The latter since, every way of life entails a 
choice, and in extension a loss. It is difficult to judge between 
values such as justice and mercy, respect and pity, et cetera, since 
it is almost impossible to decide which of these values that is 
higher, both in abstract terms and in specific contexts. The loss 
involved cannot be measured and compared by any objective 
standards. Finally, to say that one way to live is better than 
another demands that a way of life can be reduced to a single 
value, and that all such values can be measured to one master 
value and that the good can be determined regardless of the 
human beings involved.54 This chain of argument is untenable. 
In order to sum up our discussion so far, we can conclude that 
universalism is open for severe criticism by relativists. On the 
other hand, the relativist arguments are also them possible to 
criticise profoundly. Hence, we face two positions, one “worse” 
                                                     
53 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann: The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (London: Penguin Books [1966]1991), p. 79. 
54 Bikhu Parekh: “Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, p 136f. 
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than the other. I outlined my normative preferences in the 
introduction and the first section of this article. Instead of trying to 
deconstruct the relativist standpoint and, in extension, show that 
the position is untenable, which I believe is a mission impossible, 
I will accept that this standpoint exist, are influential, and 
furthermore, produce valuable insights. This (empirical) state-of-
the-art will serve as a ground for the discussion that follows. The 
situation is, however, not so discouraging, as it can seem to be at a 
cursory glance, because “embryonic” alternative paths to 
relativism and universalism are possible. Some ideas presented by 
Michael Walzer have served as an important source of inspiration 
for my thinking about an alternative path. 
Walzer argues that it might be difficult to reach an agreement 
about a “thick” universally acceptable moral code, to which all 
“local” codes conform, but there might be a ”thin” code, which at 
least can be used to de-legitimise some actions. This position, 
which can be labelled “minimum” or “thin” universalism, 
alternatively pragmatism, represents an intermediate position 
between relativism and universalism.55 Pragmatism agrees with 
the former position that moral life can be lived in several different 
ways, but insists, in agreement with the latter position, that the 
different ways of life can be judged on the basis of a (“thin”) 
universally valid body of values. Thin universalism rejects the 
idea that it is possible to show that one specific way of life is truly 
human. This difference is fundamental.56 
Moral terms, Walzer argues, “have minimal and maximal 
meanings; we can standardly give thick and thin accounts of them, 
and the two accounts are appropriate to different contexts, serve 
different purposes”. By this Walzer do not mean that we carry 
                                                     
55 Michael Walzer: Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). Chris Brown: “Human Rights”, p. 612. Cf. Mikael 
Baaz: “Meta-Theoretical Foundations for the Study of Global Social Relations from the Per-
spective of the New Political Economy of Development”; and Mikael Baaz: A Meta-
theoretical Foundations for the Study of International Relations in a Global Era: A Social 
Constructivist Approach, Ch. 6. 
56 Bikhu Parekh: “Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, p 130. 
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 around two sets of moralities in our heads. Minimalists meanings 
are, so to say, embedded in the maximal morality, expressed in the 
same idiom and sharing the same historical, cultural, and societal 
orientation. Morality is, not as might be expected, thin from the 
beginning and thicken as time pass by, on the contrary. Walzer 
argue that “[m]orality is thick from the beginning, culturally 
integrated fully resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on 
special occasions, when moral language is turned to specific 
purposes”. From this follows not that minimalism should be 
judged to be substantively minor or emotionally shallow. In fact 
the case is the opposite. Minimalism is a morality more close to 
the bone, more “pure”.57 The chief advantage with moral 
minimalism is that “it is everyone’s morality because it is no one’s 
in particular; subjective interest and cultural expression have been 
avoided or cut away”.58 The universal values constitute a kind of 
“floor” — an irreducible minimum — which no chosen way of 
life can cross and still claim to be good or even tolerated by 
others. When a society meets the basic principles, it is (more or 
less) free to organise its own way of life, just the way it considers 
being the best one.59 
Interesting to note is that minimum universalism was not — as 
in the case of universalism and relativism — developed in ancient 
Greece but in the Roman empire, which extended over a large 
number of very different societies, with (very) different moral 
codes (cf. globalisation). Due to this, the Romans were forced to 
consider how to regulate the relations between different groups 
within their empire. The unified answer was that some sort of 
universal principles were needed, however, regarding content and 
justification thinkers disagreed. Some turned to human nature, 
while others turned to the idea of some sort of cross-cultural 
consensus, however, debating the scope and significance of the 
                                                     
57 This section is based on Michael Walzer: Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and 
Abroad, pp. 2ff. The quotes are from p. 2 and p. 4, respectively. 
58 Michael Walzer: Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, p. 7. 
59 Bikhu Parekh: “Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, p 131. 
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consensus. Minimum universalism received further articulation 
from (the end of) the fifteenth century an onwards due to the 
above sketched development of an international system. Most 
European scholars emphasised cultural monism, urging that the 
world needed to be “civilised”. Only a few argued in favour of 
cultural relativism.60 Some scholars — among them Hugo Grotius 
and Samuel von Pufendorf — were unhappy with both 
perspectives, and argued instead for some sort of minimum 
universalism.61 Michael Walzer but also John Rawls and others 
are present inheritors to this tradition. The earlier mentioned 
debate about how one shall arrive at universal principles is still 
full of life and more or less follows the same lines as during the 
ancient period. 
What remains to be done in this section is to discuss two more 
issues: First, the question of how the content of the international 
human rights regime can be decided? And, secondly, when the 
content have been decided, how can it be made effective, i.e. 
enforceable? Let us deal with the questions in order. The most 
common approaches regarding the first question are trying to 
derive universal principles from the human nature or from a 
universal or hypothetical consensus. The problem is however, as 
already argued, that human nature is a too vague and blur concept 
to offer such principles, and, that no universal consensus exist 
today. Indeed some universal consensus exist, in practice e.g. 
regarding the low view of women, held by most cultures of today, 
and the use of torture, which was, according to Amnesty 
International, routinely practised by 123 out of then (1997) 185 
                                                     
60 Bikhu Parekh: “Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, p 131. 
61 Hugo Grotius, the “founding father” of international law, wrote his famous book, De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis [Laws of War and Peace], in 1625. His aim with the book was to provide a 
model to restrict wars and expand peace by clarifying standards of conduct which were insu-
lated against all religious doctrines and therefore could be able to govern the relations of all 
independent states, Protestant and Catholic (the two big western “cultures “ at that time) alike. 
Robert H. Jackson: “The Evolution of International Society” in, John Baylis and Steve Smith: 
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2nd ed., 2001), p. 43, box 2.6.  
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 sovereign states.62 This also goes for racism, discrimination, and 
contempt for the poor. These areas of consensus are however 
unacceptable. The last alternative, to construct a hypothetical 
consensus, from abstract reasoning is attached with two problems. 
On the one hand, it is (often) highly unrealistic, and, on the other 
hand, which partly follows from the first problem, the proposals 
given, due to their “unrealism” and “abstractness”, often lack 
teeth.  
If universal values are to enjoy widespread support, democratic 
validation, and, be free of ethnocentrism, they shall, as argued by 
Bhikhu Parekh, “arise out of an open and uncoerced cross-cultural 
dialogue”.63  Such a dialogue is an exceedingly complex activity 
and the level of ambition can be debated. I believe that the initial 
ambition shall, in order to be true to the “thinness” stressed above, 
be modest. Indeed, a thin universal code can continue both visions 
— in form of “human unity, human dignity, human worth, 
promotion of human well-being, and human equity — but also,64 
and in the short-run more important, a list of de-legitimate actions, 
identified within different moral codes, like e.g. the condemnation 
of genocide.  Hopefully, as Michael Walzer writes,  
the end product of this effort will be a set of standards to 
which all societies can be held — negative injunctions, most 
likely, rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and 
tyranny. Among ourselves, late twentieth century … 
Europeans, these standards will probably be expressed in the 
language of rights, which is the language of our own 
maximalism. But that is not a bad way of talking about 
injuries and wrongs that now one shall have to endure, and I 
assume that it is translatable.65 
                                                     
62 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler: “Introduction”, p. 2. 
63 Bikhu Parekh: “Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, p 139. 
64 Bikhu Parekh: “Non-ethnocentric Universalism”, p 149f. 
65 Michael Walzer: Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, p. 10. 
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The important thing to remember is that this exercise must be 
carried out as a genuine cross-cultural dialogue and not trough 
abstract deduction; otherwise the end-result will not be thrust-
worthy.66 If we proceed along this rather gentle path, change our 
time focus and take a longer perspective on international human 
rights (perhaps centuries) rather than the almost sixty years that 
have passed since the UNDHR was signed, then it might be 
possible, through the process of gradual integration, to bring 
different societies closer. Hereby the consensus around human 
wrongs can serve as a foundation for future ramification, and the 
visions given as an illustration above — which full-fill the 
standards of being everyone’s morality because they are no one’s 
in particular — can eventually come true. 
I argued above that moral values have no certain foundation in 
the sense that they are indisputable and based on objectivity. But, 
they have grounds in the forms of well-considered reasons, and 
are therefore not arbitrary. This might be disappointing for some, 
however this is the reality we have to live with. At least, if people 
do not agree to the identified human wrongs they have an (moral) 
obligation to show why the defence of them are unconvincing. If 
the opponents do not do this, they can at least be accused for being 
unreasonable.  
Since contemporary international society is a hybrid, this 
activity — to identify human wrongs and rights — can by 
advantage be carried out via regional co-operation. Then the 
process probably will speed up. I do believe that the process needs 
to be a step-by-step process, since the international society cannot 
develop further without parallel development in its corresponding 
world society. Furthermore, as argued, international societies, just 
as international systems, will most likely, both in gemeinschaft 
and gesellschaft societies emerge initially within “regional” 
subsystems and first later develop at the global level.  
                                                     
66 Cf. Michael Walzer: Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. The examples 
of human wrongs given by Walzer, are not based on a cross-cultural dialogue but on (abstract) 
deduction. 
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 This path, the path of minimum universalism or pragmatism, 
might not take us as far as some would wish, at least not in the 
short run. But it might still be the best response to contemporary 
critics of the current international human rights regime if our goal 
is to save the notion of universal human rights (in the long run). It 
is noteworthy, as stressed by Chris Brown, that most adherents of 
so-called “Asian values” — among the harshest critics of the 
moral monist approach to human rights — acknowledge the 
existence of a thin code, including issues such as the abolition of 
torture and the right to a fair trial. This does not prove anything. 
But it indicates that the path to follow suggested in this article is 
promising.  
Another weakness with the current international human rights 
regime is, as we know, the lack of an effective machinery of 
enforcement. Something that made the NATO to act in the 
irresponsible way they did during the Kosovo-crisis; a behaviour, 
that, from my point of view, does not promote the notion of 
universal human rights. On the contrary, such behaviour is in fact 
counterproductive. Among the strongest arguments against 
intervention on humanitarian grounds are that states do not 
intervene primarily for humanitarian reasons, that the principle of 
humanitarian intervention easily is abused, and selectively 
applied.67 All these objections apply in the Kosovo case. 
Therefore, if and when a “thin”, or in the distant future a non-
ethnocentric “thick”, code of human wrongs and rights has been 
developed, it is essentially that it is exercised in a principled and 
institutionalised way. Without a consistent application of clear 
principles, human rights will remain highly suspect, ineffective, 
and, extension, counterproductive; not more than an expression of 
(western) neo-imperialism. It is not acceptable to side step the SC 
(or any future substitute) and take the matter in one’s own hands. 
The regional arrangement for the protection of human rights 
practised in Europe can serve as an institutional role model for 
                                                     
67 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy: “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics, 
pp. 473f. 
 32 Mikael Baaz 
________________________________________________________________ 
how the enforcement can be carried out.68 This regional 
arrangement is interesting since it contains a procedure for 
complaining and a Court. In short: the European regime is the 
judicially most developed of all existing human rights regimes.69 
Therefore it is interesting and can serve a good role model, or 
source of inspiration.  
By this we have seen what international human rights can be; I 
have presented a constructive theory and presented some 
(tentative) measures to be taken in order to accomplish as mush as 
possible of what we initially argued to be desirable given that the 
world looks the way it does.  
Some concluding reflections:  
The international human rights regime at the dawn of 
the twenty-first century 
If we don’t change direction soon, we’ll end up where we’re 
going.70 
Change before you have to.71 
What I have tried to do in this article is to “save” the notion of 
universal human rights from some of the criticism that rightly has 
been launched against the approach (lately). As argued, this rescue 
action might not take us as far as some would wish. But, to them I 
would like to say be patient. Rome was not built in one day. We 
                                                     
68 For an overview of the European system of human rights, see e.g. Iain Cameron: An Introduc-
tion to the European Convention on Human Rights (Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 3rd ed., 1998); and, 
Henry J. Steiner and Philph Alston: International Human Rights in Context: Law. Politics. Mor-
als, pp. 786ff. 
69 Henry J. Steiner and Philph Alston: International Human Rights in Context: Law. Politics. 
Morals, p. 786. 
70 Unknown (http://www.musicfolio.com/quotes/change.htm). The site was visited 2005-04-26. 
71 Jack Welch (http://www.musicfolio.com/quotes/change.htm). The site was visited 2001-06-26. 
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 need to take a realistic time perspective on the development of a 
“true”, in the meaning that an actual commitment exist to it, 
international human rights regime. The most realistic and practicable 
path to follow is to start from an internationally agreed list of human 
wrongs that can be regionally expanded to include rights. The 
development, due to our historical heritage, necessarily needs to be 
carried out step-by-step. Otherwise, I believe, we are bound to fail.  
As argued in the introduction the contribution presented here is a 
“think piece”, an attempt to present a temporary stop in a still 
ongoing work. The ideas presented here are not my full-fledged and 
final statements of my view regarding the questions initiated and 
discussed. I hope, however, that I have presented some ideas of how 
we, if we want to save the notion of international human rights from 
it critics, can proceed in the future in a profitable way. Regarding 
methodology, my hope is that I have shown the importance to 
include normative, empirical as well as constructive theoretical 
contributions, if the aim is to give (political) recommendations of 
how to do in the future.  
Finally, since we currently do not have any secure knowledge 
about the foundations of social life (if this is at all possible) all 
construction of social scientific theories is insecure. We, more or less, 
lack control over the reality that we want to study and, in extension, 
change. This problem is accentuated when we deal with constructive 
theory since it is based upon normative and empirical theory. Karl 
Mannheim has in a brilliant way formulated the problems attached to 
the mission identified in this article. Therefore, let his words be the 
last: 
[T]o reconstruct a society under change is like changing tyres 
on a train in movement, rather than building a house on new 
foundation.72 
                                                     
72 Karl Mannheim: Man and Society. In Age of Reconstruction (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1940), p. 12, quoted in Lennart Lundquist, Demokratins väktare [The Guardians of De-
mocracy], p. 215. My translation. 
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